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To the G20 – Next steps for incentivizing antibacterial R&D 
Christine Årdal, Enrico Baraldi, Francesco Ciabuschi, Kevin Outterson, John Rex, Laura JV Piddock, 
David Findlay on behalf of the DRIVE-AB Steering Committee 
 
The antibiotic pipeline is insufficient. As one 
measure, only about five truly novel antibiotic 
classes are in clinical development for critical or 
high unmet public health needs defined by the 
World Health Organization.1,2 Given attrition rates3, 
only two of these are likely to receive regulatory 
approval during the next seven years. The earlier, 
pre-clinical phase pipeline is hard to assess, but 
may include more than a dozen novel antibiotics. 
However, their chances of success are even more 
remote and likely more than a decade away.3 
Meanwhile,  resistance rates to the world’s current 
stock of antibiotics are rising, threatening not only 
our ability to treat infections but also jeopardizing 
modern healthcare’s ability to safely treat cancer 
and perform many surgeries.4,5 Deliberate and 
coordinated action is needed now to ensure 
continuous availability of effective antibiotics.  
In 2016, the G20 committed to “unlock research 
and development into new and existing 
antimicrobials from a G20 value-added 
perspective”.6 DRIVE-AB, a three-year research 
project financed by the European Union’s 
Innovative Medicines Initiative, is close to 
concluding its work on incentives and policies to stimulate innovation, sustainable use, and equitable 
availability of novel antibiotics to meet unmet public health needs. This commentary summarizes 
some of DRIVE-AB’s findings pertinent to the G20 commitments, including a Market Entry Reward 
(MER). DRIVE-AB’s complete findings will be published and presented at our conference in Brussels 
on September 5-6, 2017. These include detailed findings and recommendations regarding new 
economic models, the societal value of antibiotics, forecasting the development of resistance, and 
responsible use measures. 
Incentives to stimulate antibacterial innovation can be grouped into two types: “push” incentives 
that pay for the research and development (R&D) and “pull” that reward an outcome such as 
regulatory approval. Significant investments are already occurring to push innovation, including grant 
financing such as the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), 
Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI), Joint Programming Initiative on Antimicrobial Resistance 
(JPIAMR), the Horizon 2020 research programme, and most recently the Combating Antibiotic 
Resistant Bacteria Biopharmaceutical Accelerator (CARB-X) and the Global Antibiotic R&D 
Partnership (GARDP) that acts as a virtual developer. These efforts are laudable, necessary and must 
continue. They ensure that the pipeline is directed to public health needs. Yet the success of these 
Box 1: Next steps for G20 members to 
incentivize antibacterial R&D 
 Immediately fill the gap of USD 250 
million per year in push funding. Existing 
mechanisms require additional 
financing and are well suited for an 
immediate in-flow of extra financing. 
 Implement Market Entry Reward (MER) 
pilots in order to learn about the 
operationalization of such models.  
 Request that regional and global 
banking institutions (such as the 
European Investment Bank and the 
World Bank) examine potential novel 
financial instruments to support further 
antibacterial R&D funding. 
 Establish a mechanism for multi-
national coordination and collaboration. 
 Develop health technology assessment 
processes and rules of reimbursement 
to consider resistance situation and 
capture antibiotic societal value.  
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initiatives in bringing novel antibiotics to market depends on continued private investment.  Our 
stakeholder analyses identify that the willingness of companies and other private investors to invest 
in antibacterial R&D is primarily driven by anticipated market rewards, i.e. the pull incentives.  
The traditional pull incentive is revenues from unit-based sales. Yet for new antibiotics, revenues 
alone may not be sufficient to incentivize companies to invest in the development of new antibiotics. 
In clinical practice, it is appropriate to reserve novel antibiotics for use against bacteria that are 
resistant to existing antibiotics. If infection prevention efforts are successful, such infections may be 
relatively rare, so sales volumes will be low. Therefore, new pull incentives are needed that 
effectively reward innovation and reduce revenues derived from sales volume – a “delinked” model. 
Without an effective pull incentive, private sector investment will continue to decline, and the few 
remaining companies will leave antibacterial R&D, further diminishing innovation.  
A fully or partially delinked MER (i.e., a financial payment to the developer or IP holder for a novel 
antibiotic that meets predefined target product profile addressing the most pressing public health 
threats) can be an effective pull mechanism. The decision on behalf of an innovator to apply for a 
MER will be voluntary. The size of the reward should be commensurate with the level of pre-defined 
need using public health criteria such as the World Health Organization’s Priority Pathogen List. 
Additionally, those antibiotics that meet more challenging criteria such as a new class should receive 
higher rewards.7 Based on our current models (final versions to be presented in September 2017), we 
estimate a MER of between USD 750 to 2,000 million, paid out to developers in installments over five 
years. Grants from public funds and foundations for preclinical and clinical trials must be accounted 
for in calculating the MER so that the public does not pay twice for innovation. Developers that 
receive a MER will also be bound by transparent and implementable sustainable use and equitable 
access obligations. 
While significant public sector investment in antibacterial R&D is already occurring, estimated at USD 
520 million annually,7 our models suggest that the public and philanthropic sectors must invest an 
additional USD 250 million in push funding annually into targeted priority antibacterial R&D areas1 to 
maintain a healthy pipeline. This excludes investments in diagnostics, vaccines, or products for 
animal health, which are also needed. Banking institutions such as the European Investment Bank 
and the World Bank could raise capital by financing medicines in other therapeutic areas and utilizing 
a portion of the returns to re-invest in antibiotics.  
Private investment must also increase. The implementation of a MER will help attract and retain 
private capital. Additionally, health technology assessment procedures need to be expanded to 
account for drug resistance prevalence and to capture the societal benefit of a specific antibiotic, 
allowing for value-based pricing based on societal benefits of the particular antibiotic (e.g., resistance 
and cross-resistance rates). With these incentives, our models suggest that private sector investment 
will at least double the public sector push contribution.  
Implementation of a MER is complex and unprecedented. DRIVE-AB and others8-10 have extensively 
explored multiple implementation options, ranging from country level arrangements to the transfer 
of intellectual property to a global organization. All options have their pros and cons and cost/benefit 
implications. These will be fully articulated in our final report.  
Setting up infrastructure to implement MERs will take financial investment and time. We see that 
different models can be introduced as infrastructure and expertise is built up. In the near term, 
different national and multi-national solutions need to be designed to work synergistically with 
others.  Piloting MERs can help to understand these synergies and the operationalization. Yet 
implementing a forum for global coordination is urgent, as innovators need clear messages about 
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global priorities. Next steps for incentivizing antibacterial R&D that can be taken by the G20 countries 
immediately are noted in Box 1. DRIVE-AB’s detailed recommendations will be available in 
September. 
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